

Message Text

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R 211902Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2117
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 2549

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET STATEMENT
AT 21 MARCH 1974 PLENARY MEETING

FOLLOWING IS USDEL TRANSLATION OF 21 MARCH PLENARY
STATEMENT BY USSR. SOVIET REP CRITIQUED THE WESTERN
REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF 22 NOVEMBER ON THE QUESTIONS OF
WHO WOULD REDUCE (THE NON-US NATO PARTICIPANTS HAVE
NOT YET INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE), WHAT WOULD
BE REDUCED (AGAIN HE CALLED FOR INCLUSION OF AIR AND
NUCLEAR ELEMENTS), AND HOW MUCH SHOULD BE REDUCED.
THE SOVIET REP INVITED WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE
8 NOVEMBER EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL,
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SAYING THAT THE SIZE OF THE PROPOSED 1975 REDUC-

TION COULD BE VARIED IF THE NUMBER OF 20,000 DID
NOT APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTABLE.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 5 FEBRUARY THE SOVIET DELEGATION STRESSED ESPECIALLY THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL ELEVEN STATES ENTERING INTO THE CATEGORY OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMEENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE SHOWED THAT ONLY ON THIS CONDITION IS IT POSSIBLE TO ENSURE IN THE BEST WAY ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS, AND ABOVE ALL THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES. IT IS PRECISELY FOR THAT REASON THAT WE POSED THE QUESTION: WHEN AND TO WHAT EXTENT WILL GREAT BRITAIN, THE FRG, CANADA AND THE OTHER WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BE READY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE?

2. MORE THAN A MONTH HAS PASSED SINCE THAT TIME. UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE NOT SO FAR RECEIVED A CLEAR ANSWER TO THAT APPARENTLY SIMPLE QUESTION. INSTEAD, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, BY CONTINUING TO INSIST ON THE CONSIDERATION OF THE REDUCTION ONLY OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ARE ATTEMPTING TO PUT OFF THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE FUTURE AGREEMENTS TO SOME LATER AND UNDEFINED TIME.

3. IN AVOIDING A REPLY TO OUR QUESTION ON THE EXTENT AND TIMES OF REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES, OUR PARTNERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REFER TO THE FACT THAT A PROVISION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CEILINGS ON THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT ALONG WITH AN OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTION. IN THE STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR QUARLES VAN UFFORD, THE PROPOSAL ON THE CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILINGS WAS PRESENTED AS A KIND OF GUARANTEE ON THE PART OF THE WEST WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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REGARD TO A SECOND PHASE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE OTHER SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE US THAT THIS PROVIDES THE ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION.

4. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH A REPLY CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SATISFACTORY. IF WE TAKE THE SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON

CEILINGS, IT GIVES AN EXPOSITION OF THEIR APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS SCHEME THAT EQUAL COMMON CEILINGS FOR THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH OF THE GROUPINGS MUST BE ESTABLISHED AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MUST REDUCE MORE OF THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THAN THE NATO COUNTRIES. BUT THIS SCHEME DOES NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION WHY ALL SEVEN WESTERN COUNTRIES CANNOT REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM THE FIRST PHASE IN ORDER TO REACH SUCH COMMON CEILINGS. ONE CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHAT PREVENTS GREAT BRITAIN, THE FRG, CANADA AND THE OTHER WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM REDUCING THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING ALONG WITH ALL THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED CONVINCING EXPLANATIONS OF THIS QUESTION.

5. SOMETIMES WE HEAR STATEMENTS BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT IT IS EASIER TO REDUCE AMERICAN AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, SINCE THEY WOULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE TERRITORY OF THEIR OWN COUNTRIES, BUT MORE DIFFICULT TO REDUCE NATIONAL ARMED FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE THOSE OF THE FRG. THE QUESTION ARISES, HOWEVER, WHY IN SUCH A CASE THE OTHER FOREIGN ARMED FORCES, SUCH AS THE TROOPS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE FRG TO WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, ARE NOT INCLUDED IN REDUCTION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

6. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR - STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS - HAVE STATED DIRECTLY THAT THEY ARE READY TO SET ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON A MUTUAL BASIS.

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2118

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 VIENNA 2549

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

7. OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE A SERIOUS CHARACTER. THEIR RESULTS WILL HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. WE THEREFORE CANNOT PERMIT ANY OBSCURITY OR AMBIGUITY WITH REGARD TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. A PROMISE TO CONDUCT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, HINTS BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THAT A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS WILL DEAL MAINLY WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AN AGREEMENT (BESIDES THE US) - THIS IS AN APPROACH WHICH CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SATISFACTORY. AN AGREEMENT CAN BE CONCLUDED ONLY IF THERE ARE PRECISE OBLIGATIONS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS ON THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS. THEREFORE WE AWAIT FROM THE SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES THE ASSUMPTION OF CONCRETE AND PRECISE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN DEFINITE PERIODS OF TIME.

8. IN EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE INCLUSION IN REDUCTION SIMULTANEOUSLY OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES, WE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCE. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT ALL THE ELEVEN STATES TO WHICH IT WAS

DECIDED IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS TO GRANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE DECISIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALREADY MAKING EXTENSIVE USE OF THIS RIGHT. HOWEVER, THE GRANTING OF SUCH A RIGHT ALSO IMPOSES SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS: NAMELY, DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AND FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW THERE ARE NO FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ATTEMPT OF SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN FOR THEMSELVES CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

9. ALTHOUGH OUR TALKS ARE TAKING PLACE IN A BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE, IT IS CLEAR THAT DIFFICULTIES KNOWN TO EVERYBODY HAVE BEEN CREATED AT THEM. THESE DIFFICULTIES HAVE ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES DO NOT WISH TO BE INCLUDED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN THE PROCESS OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF ALL THE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT PROGRESS AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS IMPOSSIBLE. FROM THIS IT IS NECESSARY TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

MR CHAIRMAN,

10. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CEILINGS ON THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IS UNACCEPTABLE.

11. IN ITS STATEMENT ON 28 NOVEMBER 1973, THE SOVIET DELEGATION DEMONSTRATED THAT OVER A LENGTHY PERIOD THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN REGARDED BY CONFIDENTIAL

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BOTH SIDES AS ENSURING A DEFINITE STABILITY. THIS CONCLUSION, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THIS AGAIN, WAS MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE EVALUATION NOT OF ANY SINGLE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, LET US SAY OF GROUND FORCES, BUT OF THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES IN THAT AREA. MOREOVER, IT IS EVIDENT, AND THIS HAS ALSO ALREADY BEEN SPOKEN OF, THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE IS DETERMINED ALSO BY SUCH FACTORS AS THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THE RESERVES OF MANPOWER, TRANSPORT CAPACITIES, VOLUME OF ARMS PRODUCTION AND SO ON. A DEFINITE CONCLUSION FOLLOWS FROM ALL THIS: THE DESIRE OF THE WESTERN STATES TO TAKE OUT FROM ALL THE ARMED FORCES ONLY ONE ELEMENT, GROUND FORCES, AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME UNDER WHICH SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD EVEN INCREASE THEIR GROUND FORCES INSTEAD OF REDUCING THEM,

AND THEIR EXCLUSION FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD ONLY STIMULATE A RACE IN THEM, SERVE ONE AIM - TO RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

12. THE DESIRE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES DISPLAYS ITSELF ALSO IN THE QUESTION OF WHAT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. THE DELEGATIONS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES SPEAK OF THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE ONLY AMERICAN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND, TO PUT IT MILDLY, "FORGET" THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THESE FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME THEY PROPOSE TO INCLUDE SOVIET ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN REDUCTIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE OTHER SIX WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOT A WORD HAS BEEN SAID. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER BRITAIN AND CANADA, FOR EXAMPLE, INTEND TO WITHDRAW THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THEIR FORCES FROM THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE AT THE TIME OF THEIR REDUCTION, AND WHETHER THE WESTERN COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WILL REMOVE ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE COMBAT STOCKS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES? THIS QUESTION HAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE FOR MOVEMENT FORWARD IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE

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REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITAIN AND CANADA, THE FRG, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS WHEN AND IN WHAT QUANTITY THEY WILL BE READY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2119

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

13. THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE PROCEEDS DIRECTLY FROM THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS, WHICH ENVISAGED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND, I EMPHASIZE, ARMAMENTS WOULD BE EXAMINED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE CANNOT FAIL TO SEE THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS CONFINED TO THE REDUCTION OF MANPOWER ALONE WOULD BE INCOMPLETE AND WOULD NOT CORRESPOND TO THE TASK OF THE GENUINE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPEAN STATES.

14. IN WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT CENTRAL EUROPE IS AN AREA OF HIGH CONCENTRATION OF BOTH
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CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL MEANS FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR. THERE ARE OVERALL IN THE EQUIPMENT OF THE GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES OF THE ELEVEN STATES IN THIS AREA THOUSANDS OF TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, GUNS AND MORTARS AND A GREAT QUANTITY OF HELICOPTERS AND ANTI-TANK DEVICES, AND ALSO OF OTHER VARIOUS COMBAT EQUIPMENT. THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MEANS OF DELIVERY OF THIS WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO ITS TARGET ARE DEPLOYED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

15. ONE NEED HAVE NO SPECIAL MILITARY TRAINING TO UNDERSTAND THE EVIDENT TRUTH THAT THE COMBAT MIGHT OF ALL TYPES OF MODERN ARMED FORCES, WHETHER THEY BE GROUND FORCES OR AIR FORCES, IS CHARACTERISED NOT ONLY BY THEIR MANPOWER, BUT MAINLY BY

THE ARMAMENT AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY HAVE WITH THEM.

16. IT IS THEREFORE NATURAL THAT THE CRITERION OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, WHICH THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSE SHOULD BE MADE THE BASIS OF REDUCTION, IN ISOLATION FROM THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE FORCES, IS NOT CORRECT OR JUSTIFIED. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS ALSO FURNISHED BY THE FACT THAT THE PLANS OF NATO AND THE EUROGROUP ADOPTED IN RECENT YEARS - THE SO-CALLED AD-70 AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMME (EDIP) - LAY PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE RE-EQUIPMENT OF NATO ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH ARE IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE, WITH NEW WEAPONS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, IN BOTH THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESPECTS.

17. IS IT NOT FOR THIS REASON THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE DEFENDING THEIR PROPOSALS OF 22 NOVEMBER 1973, IN WHICH IN PLACE OF THE REDUCTION OF AMERICAN ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT IS ENVISAGED NO MORE THAN THEIR STOCKPILING IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE? WHERE IS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN THIS? IS THIS NOT A DEPARTURE FROM THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON THIS SCORE AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS? ONLY A REDUCTION WHICH EXTENDED, TOGETHER WITH THE PERSONNEL OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES, TO ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE REALLY EFFECTIVE AND WOULD ALLOW US TO ATTAIN THE AIMS FACING OUR NEGOTIATIONS. (AT THIS POINT KHLESTOV DELIVERED EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS. SEE END OF TEXT)

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18. FOR THEIR PART THE DELEGATIONS OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES WHICH ARE PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS HAVE CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY SET OUT THEIR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THESE STATES WHICH HAS BEEN TABLED THERE IS CLEAR MENTION OF THE PROPOSED QUANTITIES AND FORM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THE ARAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS. WE EXPECT FROM THE WESTERN COUNTRIES STATEMENTS OF HOW AND IN WHAT QUANTITIES THEY ARE READY TO REDUCE THE ARMAMENT AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. MR CHAIRMAN,

IN EXAMING THE POSITIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WE AGAIN AND AGAIN RUN UP AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY NATO COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST

STATES. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CAME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SERIOUS INTENTION AND WITH READINESS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS CONFORMING WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES AND WITH THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING DETENTE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THEY ARE NOT TRYING TO OBTAIN FOR THEMSELVES ANY UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. BUT THEY WILL NOT AGREE, NATURALLY, TO DECISIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE SUCH ADVANTAGES TO THE OTHER SIDE AND WILL NOT PERMIT ANY HARM TO BE DONE TO THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR.

20. THE PROGRAMME OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WAS DRAFTED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVELY EXISTING CLOSE INTER-DEPENDENCE BETWEEN GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ALSO BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND FOREIGN COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF WHICH BOTH SIDES DISPOSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PRACTICAL REALISATION OF THIS PROGRAMME WOULD MEAN THAT THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS AREA DURING THE YEARS

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1975 TO 1977 BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT. THAT WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY BE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION, WHICH WOULD ASSURE GREATER SECURITY FOR EUROPEAN STATES AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND WITH LESS MATERIAL EXPENDITURE.

21. AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS IN THREE STAGES. WE WOULD LIKE IN THIS CONNECTION AGAIN TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FIRST STAGE OF THE REDUCTIONS, PROPOSED IN ARTICLE 2 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. IN THE FIRST PHASE - IN THE COURSE OF 1975 - THE USA, BELGIUM, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, THE FRG, LUXEMBOURG AND THE NETHERLANDS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY AN OVERALL FIGURE OF 20,000 MEN WITH CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE SOVIET UNION, THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD REDUCE THEIR TROOPS ALSO BY AN OVERALL FIGURE OF 20,000 MEN WITH CORRESPONDING ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

22. WE ASSUME THAT THE SIZE OF THE CONTINGENT OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH EACH PARTICIPANT IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE IN ORDER TO BRING THE REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES ON EACH SIDE OVERALL TO 20,000 MEN WITH CORRESPONDING ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT COULD BE DETERMINED IN PROPORTION TO THE QUANTITY OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF WHICH THE PARTICIPANT IN QUESTION DISPOSES IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT SUCH A PRINCIPLE FOR DETERMINING THE SIZE OF INDIVIDUAL CONTINGENTS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION IS THE FAIREST. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, WOULD BE READY TO SEEK TOGETHER WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, OTHER VARIANTS ALSO OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE SIZES OF SUCH REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE

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ELEMENTS OF SUCH A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION.

23. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED

FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF EACH SIDE BY AN OVERALL FIGURE OF 20,000 MEN WITH CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE A RELATIVELY SMALL, SO TO SPEAK A SYMBOLIC, REDUCTION, BUT IT WOULD WITHOUT DOUBT HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD IN ITSELF ASSIST THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE AND WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEAN STATES WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE FRUITFUL CONDUCT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER THIS INITIAL REDUCTION WOULD HELP US TO ACCUMULATE A DEGREE OF EXPERIENCE WHICH WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR THE SUBSEQUENT MORE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

24. A GREAT JOURNEY BEGINS WITH THE FIRST STEP. THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED WOULD BE QUITE CAPABLE OF BEING SUCH A STEP. IT WOULD BE A CONVINCING TESTIMONY TO THE READINESS OF ALL ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SET OUT ON THE PATH OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND WOULD GIVE A START TO THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE.

END TEXT PREPARED STATEMENT.

BEGIN TEXT EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS:

I CANNOT FAIL TO POINT OUT THAT THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR WHICH HAS JUST BEEN PUT FOWARD BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UK AND WHICH THE WESTERN DELEGATES ARE TRYING TO USE TO JUSTIFY THEIR PROPOSALS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS A CONVINCING ONE. I DON'T INTEND TO REPEAT WHAT WAS SAID ON THIS QUESTION BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AMBASSADOR KLEIN. IN HIS VERY THOROUGH AND DETAILED STATEMENT, HE SHOWED, QUITE RIGHTLY IN OUR VIEW, THAT THE QUESTION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR SUCH PROPOSALS AS TO HOW WE ARE TO DEAL WITH WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO BE RETAINED BY THE US ARMED FORCES AND, INDEED, BY FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES.
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END TEXT EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS.TRINKA

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA02549
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740060-0650
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740324/aaaaawtt.tel
Line Count: 593
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
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To: STATE
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